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DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PRISONERS WITH
AIDS-EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS CLAIMS
ARISING FROM SEGREGATION AND DENIAL OF
CONJUGAL VISITS
L INThODUCT7ION
AIDS, or acquired immune deficiency (or immunodeficiency)
syndrome, has been characterized as the "epidemic of the century."1
"The first cases of what [has become] known as AIDS were reported
to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) during May and June of
1981. "' Since 1981, over 30,000 cases of AIDS have been verified
in the United States, alone.3  Naturally, because AIDS is so
prevalent in society, many cases have appeared in prisons around the
country. The New York State Commission of Corrections reported
in September of 1987 that 438 inmates died of AIDS between 1981
and June of 1987.4
There is a fair amount of documentation which has been
provided by the courts of our country concerning discrimination
against persons with AIDS who are not incarcerated.5 However, dis-
crimination against incarcerated persons with AIDS is judicially less
developed and, therefore, deserves more attention. "Scapegoated
* I would like to thank William D. Gibney, Esq. of Prisoners' Legal Services of New
York for his kindness in allowing me to obtain copies of the briefs that were filed in the Doe
v. Coughlin case. Also contributing to the brief for the appellants, John and Jane Doe, were
Deborah Schneer, Esq., Robert Selcov, Esq., David C. Leven, Esq., and Maurie G. Heins,
Esq.
1. Starrett, Foreword to L. MASS, MEDICAL ANSWERS ABOUT AIDS at v (1987).
2. L. MASS, supra note 1, at 1.
3. Harder, A Legal Guide for the Education of Legislators Facing the Inevitable Question:
AIDS: The Problem is Real-- What Do We Do?, 13 J. CONTEMP. L. 121, 122 (1987).
4. Howell, Inmate AIDS Deaths Raise Questions, Newsday, Sept. 22, 1987, at 19, col. 1.
5. E.g., District 27 Community School Bd. v. Board of Educ. 130 Misc. 2d 398, 502
N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (discrimination against school children with AIDS); Dimiceli
& Sons Funeral Home v. New York City Comm'n on Human Rights, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 14,
1987, at 7, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (discrimination by funeral home against a person who died
from AIDS).
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throughout society, incarcerated people are most likely to be
punished for AIDS and the least likely to get assistance."6 One of
the most important issues facing prison administration is how to
deal with prisoners who either enter prison with AIDS, develop
AIDS, or test positive for HIV while incarcerated.7 Additionally,
what happens when prisoners with AIDS desire to have family and
conjugal visits? These questions and many like them are only
beginning to be addressed by the prison administrators and courts
around the country. So far the courts have ruled that segregation
of inmates with AIDS satisfies both equal protection and due
process
This note will attempt to explore the contours of the legal
analysis which has shaped the decisions regarding inmates with
AIDS. Additionally, this note will undertake a consideration of
some of the leading cases on administrative regulation inside prisons;
this inquiry indicates the direction in which the courts are likely to
move in deciding future cases regarding inmates with AIDS. Finally,
this note will recommend policies which, if implemented, would give
greater protection to inmates with AIDS and lessen the threat to
their constitutional rights to due process and equal protection under
both federal and state law.
II. EARLY PERSPECTIVES ON PRISONERS Wrm AIDS
Perhaps the first prominent case concerning prisoners with
AIDS was LaRocca v. Dalsheim,9 where a trial court set what has
become the prevailing view toward inmates with AIDS. The court
deemed administrative segregation of prisoners with AIDS from the
general prison population acceptable because of what it termed "the
6. Lynn & Petersen, AIDS In California Prisons, California Prisoner, Sept. 1987, at 1, 8.
7. HIV is the abbreviation for human T cell lymphotropic virus variant 111. See L. MASS,
supra note 1, at 2.
8. Cordero v. Coughlin, 607 F. Supp. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Doe v. Coughlin, 125 A.D.2d
783, 509 N.Y.S.2d 209 (3d Dep't 1986).
9. LaRocca v. Dalsheim, 120 Misc. 2d 697, 467 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
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notoriety of sexual violence, force, and intimidation in prison.""
The risk of forced sex in prison is compounded, the court
observed, because many inmates have a history of IV drug use, IV
drug users being one of the most significant high risk groups for
AIDS."1 When Dalsheim was decided in 1983, the court was limited
in its findings by the early state of medical knowledge concerning
the transmission of AIDS, 2 but it noted that the Centers for Disease
Control stated that there was little or no risk from casual contacy.'3
Since the total number of inmates with AIDS at the facility was
reported to be three,14 the court did not see segregation as an
overreaction because of the uncertainty surrounding the transmission
of AIDS. Under New York law, 5 the court declined to direct the
removal of those inmates to an outside hospital. 6 As long as
precautions were taken, the court would not allow a wholesale
quarantine of those prisoners. 7 Additionally, the court directed that
all inmates at the Downstate facility be provided with a brochure
prepared by the Department of Health. Finally, the court declined
to intervene to reduce the potential threat of AIDS because it
10. Id. at 707, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 309. In Dalsheim, several prisoners sought an "injunction
against forming or maintaining a central AIDS program .... and an order halting all inmate
and employee movement in and out of the prison until examinations are given." Id. at 698,
467 N.Y.S.2d at 304.
11. Id. at 701-02, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 306. For specific figures as to the number of
intravenous drug users who, while incarcerated, died from AIDS in correctional facilities in
New York State from October 1981 to October 1985, see N.Y. STATE COMM'N OF
CORRECTION, ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME, A DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF NEW
YORK STATE INMATE MORTALTIES, 1981-1985, at 13 (1986).
12. Dalsheim, 120 Misc. 2d at 703, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 307.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 702, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 306.
15. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 141 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1987). The Commissioner of
Corrections may direct the removal of inmates from a facility in which any pestilence or
contagious disease shall break out. Id. The statute, however, does not define pestilence or
contagious disease.
16. Dalsheim, 120 Misc. 2d at 709, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 311.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 707, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 310. The purpose of the distribution of the Brochure
was for the "dissemination of information among inmates [to] reduce the incidence of prison
sex." Id.
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would not cast itself in the "position of managing the prison." 9 The
developing state of medical knowledge on AIDS was given as one
of the reasons for the court's decision."
Dalsheim influenced later cases in two ways: judicial acceptance
of segregation of inmates with AIDS due to the risk of forced sex,
and judicial reluctance to intervene in matters of prison administra-
tion.
Although Dalsheim represents one of the first cases involving
inmates with AIDS, it did not address any state or federal constitu-
tional issues.2" In 1984, in Cordero v. Coughlin,22 a federal district
court addressed federal constitutional issues in connection with
plaintiffs' "motion to enjoin segregation of AIDS sufferers from [the]
general [prison] population."' The prisoners brought a civil rights
action24 alleging that the segregation practiced by the prison officials
deprived them of "social, recreational, and rehabilitative oppor-
tunities,"'  thus violating their equal protection and due process
rights under the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution.' The inmates also claimed a denial of due process
based on a New York law 7 governing the administration of
correctional facilities.' Significantly, in noting that both the origin
19. Id. at 710, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 311.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 697, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 302.
22. Cordero v. Coughlin, 607 F. Supp. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
23. Id. at 10.
24. Id. at 10. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section,
any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Id.
25. Cordero, 607 F. Supp. at 10.
26. U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
27. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 7, §§ 260.1-264.1, 270.1 (1985) (allowing prison
officials to act without a hearing).
28. Cordero, 607 F. Supp. at 10.
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and transmission of the disease were poorly understood,29 the court
implicitly recognized the developing and unsettled medical state of
opinion on AIDS that characterized the Dalsheim" opinion. Further,
the court noted that these prisoners were greatly feared and
"ostracized" by the rest of the prison population."1
In addressing the prisoners' equal protection claim, the court
stated that because the prisoners had AIDS, they were not similarly
situated and, therefore, did not have to be treated equal to other
prisoners.32 Further, the court refused to place AIDS victims within
the "suspect class" category.3 "[So] long as there is a legitimate
governmental end sought and the means used are rationally related
to that end, the Equal Protection Clause is not violated."34 The
court found that New York State had met this "rational relationship"
test because the fears, tensions, and harms that could result from
the presence of these inmates among the general prison population
supported their segregation.'3 Also, the constant evolution of the
state's programs in adjusting to the needs of prisoners with AIDS
was a rational means to the state's objective.'
The court in Cordero denied the due process claim under the
fourteenth amendment 37 stating that "the transfer of an inmate to
less amenable and more restrictive quarters for nonpunitive reasons
is well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by
29. Id.
30. LaRocca v. Dalsheim, 120 Misc. 2d 697, 710, 467 N.Y.S.2d 302, 311 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
31. Cordero, 607 F. Supp. at 10.
32. Id. (citing Francis v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 532 F.2d 268, 272-73 (2d
Cir. 1976)).
33. Id. (citing Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976)).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. For a discussion of one such program, the Family Reunion Program, see infra
note 46 and accompanying text.
37. Cordero, 607 F. Supp at 10. The court relied on Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460
(1983), a case in which an inmate, found guilty of misconduct by a review committee, was
removed from his cell and confined to administrative segregation. Id. at 460-61. The
inmate's misconduct was in connection with a prison riot which left two guards injured. Id.
at 462-64. The Court found that the inmate "received all the process that was due after being
confined to administrative segregation." Id. at 477.
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a prison sentence."' Finally, under the applicable New York law,39
the court found that there was "no requirement of a hearing before
prison officials can act."' The court found that the prison officials'
decision was "clearly one of discretion" and therefore, as a matter of
law, the prisoners' due process claims could not prevail. 1
Once again it is apparent that prison officials who segregate
inmates with AIDS from the general prison population are justified
considering the risk that these inmates pose to themselves and
others, and that courts are reluctant to intervene in "administrative"
matters.
III A REcrlrr Vmw ON AIDS IN PRISONS
In Doe v. Coughlin,' a situation which presented constitutional
issues similar to those in the earlier prison cases, an inmate with
AIDS was denied a conjugal visit with his wife, whom he had
married while in prison. 3 The New York State Correction Commis-
sion, the agency which authorized the Family Reunion Program,
processed and eventually denied Doe's request." The inmate
involved was told he could not participate because he had AIDS,
which the Assistant Commissioner of Health Services termed a
"communicable" disease." The appellate court stated that the
determination of whether AIDS was a "communicable" disease was
not dispositive, since the real issue was whether the Commission's
"de facto policy of barring inmates afflicted with AIDS from
participation in the Family Reunion Program [had] a rational basis."'
38. Cordero, 607 F. Supp. at 10 (quoting Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468).
39. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & RFas. tit. 7, §§ 260.1 - 264.1, 270.1 (1985).
40. Cordero, 607 F. Supp. at 10.
41. Id.
42. Doe v. Coughlin, 125 A.D.2d 783, 509 N.Y.S.2d 209 (3d Dep't 1986) (per curiam).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 784, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 210.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 785, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 211. The Family Reunion Program (N.Y. COMP. CODES
R. & REGS. tit. 7, § 220.1 (1985)) was established under the authority of N.Y. CORRECT. LAW
§§ 112(1), 146 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1987). The Family Reunion Program is designed
to give selected inmates and their families a chance to meet in privacy for an extended period
[Vol. VI
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The court then proceeded to find this policy "entirely rational."47
The court, as others had before, emphasized the uncertainty
surrounding the genesis of the disease, admitting though that the
"principal methods of transmission have been epidemiologically
identified."'  The court stated that while casual contact was not a
likely source of transmission, it was still an unresolved question.49
Therefore, the court said that since the prison could not guarantee
that the AIDS virus would not be transmitted in this visit, the policy
of total exclusion would be rational." Citing Cordero," the court
denied Doe's equal protection claim, implicitly saying that AIDS
sufferers were not similarly situated to other inmates. 2 The court
found Doe's constitutional claim concerning the right to a hearing
to determine his eligibility for a conjugal visit unavailing, maintaining
that there is no "constitutional right to conjugal visitation within the
state prison system."53
The Doe case presented a new angle on the usual claim of
prisoners with AIDS in that it did not involve a deliberate attempt
at segregation within the general prison population:54 Doe had
already been placed in the hospital unit at the prison after his
diagnosis.15 Ironically, what the state advocated in Doe was protec-
tion not for Doe himself, but for his wife.56 Again, the court stressed
that due to the limited medical evidence concerning the transmission
and genesis of the AIDS virus, coupled with the high risk population
and "operational exigencies"57 (another phrase for administrative
of time. N.Y. COMP. CODEs R. & RFGS. tit. 7, § 220.1 (1985).
47. Doe, 125 A.D.2d at 786, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 211.
48. Id., 509 N.Y.S.2d at 211-12.
49. Id., 509 N.Y.S.2d at 211.
50. Id.
51. Cordero v. Coughlin, 607 F. Supp. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
52. Doe, 125 A.D.2d at 787, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 212-13.
53. Id., 509 N.Y.S.2d at 212 (quoting Mary of Oakknoll v. Coughlin, 101 AD.2d 931,
932, 475 N.Y.S.2d 644, 646 (3d Dep't 1984)).
54. Id. at 783, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 209.
55. Id. at 784, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 210.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 786, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 212.
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reasons) connected to the disease, the prison's policy of segregating,
and in this case preventing a conjugal visit, survived the rational
basis test. 8
IV. FUTURE CASES CONCERNING INMATES WrmI AIDS:
CONSIDERA-7ION OF CONSTITUTONAL
ANALYSIS AND INSTTuONAL POLICY
So far, consideration of inmates with AIDS has been the focus
of this note. However, discussion of the rights of inmates with
AIDS is an issue which requires a broader look at administrative
regulation and discretion in order to understand the basis for court
decisions on this issue. This inquiry indicates the direction courts
will likely move toward in deciding future cases regarding inmates
with AIDS.
Perhaps the foremost authority on the reasonableness of prison
regulations is derived from the United States Supreme Court
opinion in Turner v. Safley 9 Turner, decided in the 1987 term,
relates to regulations concerning prison mail and marriage restric-
tions."
The Supreme Court in Turner determined that its own holding
in Procunier v. Martinez,1 the case upon which the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circiut relied, did not require the application of a
strict scrutiny standard.' Martinez, the Court explained, was based
only on consideration of the rights of those who were not pri-
58. Id. at 786-87, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 212. See also Ford & Quam, AIDS Quarantine, 8 J.
LEGAL MED. 353 (1987) for an excellent discussion of the legal implications concerning
prospective quarantining of AIDS sufferers.
59. Turner v. Safley, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987).
60. Id.
61. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). Martinez involved a class action brought
by prison inmates in California facilities who challenged regulations on prisoner mail
censorship and a ban against the use of law students and legal paraprofessionals to conduct
attorney-client interviews with inmates. Id. at 398.
62. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2260-61.
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soners,63 an issue quite distinct from the prisoners' claims in Turner.'
The court of appeals believed that Martinez represented the closest
analogy for the appropriate standard of review for prisoners'
constitutional claims.' The Court in Turner then proceeded to make
clear what standard of scrutiny should be used to decide prisoners'
constitutional claims. The Court held that "when a prison regula-
tion impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid
if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."'
In rejecting the strict scrutiny analysis, the Court based its
decision on the unfavorable results of exacting judicial scrutiny of
administrative judgment.67 As a guide to the lower federal courts,
the Court listed some relevant factors for determining the reason-
ableness of a prison regulation.' "First, there must be a 'valid,
rational connection' between the prison regulation and the legitimate
governmental interest put forward to justify it."'69 Second, alternate
means must be left open for the inmates to exercise these rights.7'
A third factor is the impact that the asserted right has on "guards
and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources
generally."'" Finally, "the absence of ready alternatives is evidence
of the reasonableness of a prison regulation."' In connection with
this last factor, the Court also noted that if a prisoner "can point to
an alternative [which] fully accommodates the prisoner's rights at de
minimis cost to valid penological interests, a court may consider that
63. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 408. The Court's decision focused on the first amendment
right of the receiver of the mail rather than the prisoner's right to send the mail. Id. at 408-
09.
64. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2260. Essentially, as the Court makes clear, the "proper standard
of review for prison restrictions on correspondence between prisoners and members of the
general public could be decided without resolving the 'broad questions of "prisoners' rights."
" Id. at 2259-60 (quoting Martinez, 416 U.S. at 408).
65. Id. at 2261.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 2261-62.
68. Id. at 2262.
69. Id. (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable
relationship standard."' In applying this new standard, the Court
invalidated the regulation on marriage here, but sustained the
regulation on prisoners' mail. 4
In striking down the marriage regulation, the Court ack-
nowledged that the regulation may "entail a consequential restriction
on the rights of those who are not prisoners."' 5  This is quite
significant for present and future claims of inmates with AIDS who
challenge restrictions similar to those involved in Turner,6 especially
with regard to conjugal visits.
Future cases dealing with inmates who have AIDS must address
the constitutional basis for the special classification of inmates within
prisons. To this point the focus has been on cases brought by
prisoners who actually had AIDS. Due to the short history of the
disease, cases brought by AIDS sufferers are limited in number, thus
it is imperative that cases dealing with segregation inside prisons
brought by noninfected prisoners be examined to understand the
obstacles faced by AIDS litigants.
Sher v. Coughlin,' involved a prisoner who had been transferred
from the general population of the Auburn Correctional Facility to
the Reclassification Unit of the Attica Correctional Facility, a
Special Housing Unit.' Although the inmate had been implicated
in a scheme to defraud other prisoners at the Auburn Facility, he
had never been formally found guilty of the charge.79 At the Attica
Facility this inmate was subjected to a restrictive confinement which
included denial of job assignments, vocational and other programs,
73. Id. Alternative regulations relate to inmates with AIDS because it can be argued
that educational efforts are a reasonable alternative, at a cost not any greater than other
actions. See infra notes 190, 216-18, 223-33 and accompanying text.
74. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2262-63.
75. Id. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, noted that under the Martinez standard
the prisoners could have argued a consequential restriction on those who were not prisoners.
Id. at 2265-66.
76. Id. at 2255-56.
77. Sher v. Coughlin, 739 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1984).
78. Id. at 79. The Special Housing Unit referred to was established under N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGs. tit. 7, §§ 300.2 (b), 300.3(b) (1983).
79. Sher, 739 F.2d at 79.
[Vol.VI
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as well as limited visitation rights and confinement to his cell in
excess of the general prison population's confinement.'
The court dismissed Sher's procedural due process liberty
interest claim by relying on Hewitt v. Helms81 and a New York State
law' which allows an inmate to be placed in a Special Housing Unit
for the "purpose of evaluation and reclassification."' The court also
held that even if his confinement was based on a punitive motive,
which would render the statute inapplicable,' the fact that it was for
an administrative purpose was sufficient to justify the action.'
In a case from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, Paoli
v. Lally,s a prisoner who was receiving medical treatment in the
form of psychotherapy and injections of depo-provera to control his
sexual urges, challenged his transfer back into a medium security
facility on due process and equal protection grounds."
In denying the inmate's liberty interest claim based on Maryland
statutes,8 the court emphasized the discretionary authority of the
Commissioner of Corrections to control the transfer of inmates in
80. Id.
81. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
82. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 7, § 300.3(b)(5) (1983).
83. Sher, 739 F.2d at 79. The Correction officials argued that Sher's transfer was needed
to evaluate his adjustment to prison life, to uncover the source of his difficulties, and to
determine an appropriate classification facility and program. Id.
84. Id. at 81. The court cited N.Y. CORRECr. LAw § 137(1) (McKinney 1987 & Supp.
1988) as the statutory authority for the New York regulations. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 7, §§ 300.3(5) (1983), Id. §§ 304.1(a)(4), 304.2(a) (1986). Sher, 739 F.2d at 81.
However, it is clear that one of the purposes of the classification is to discourage future
violations of the law by the inmate. N.Y. CORRECr. LAW § 137(1) (McKinney 1987 & Supp.
1988). Here, it was never proven that Sher caused the scheme to defraud the other inmates
which the officials at Auburn apparently linked to him. Sher, 739 F.2d at 79. The statute
is unclear as to whether it was designed to discourage future violations of the law inside
prisons. Id. at 81-82. Therefore, if Sher was never guilty of this scheme, then his
classification to the more restrictive Attica facility was clearly inequitable.
85. Sher, 739 F.2d at 81.
86. Paoli v. Lally, 812 F.2d 1489 (4th Cir. 1987).
87. Id. at 1491. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
88. MD. ANN. CODE, art. 27, §§ 674, 676, 690(b), 690A (1987).
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the absence of any contrary authority." In denying Paoli's equal
protection claim the court noted that the circumstances of his
confinement were quite unique.' Further, in a statement especially
relevant to AIDS afflicted inmates, the court noted that the
circumstances surrounding Paoli's drug treatment, and the risks
associated with his discontinuance of the therapy if he should be
released or escape, justified this singular treatment.91
Using reasoning similar to that utilized in Paoli's case, other
prison officials could easily determine that prisoners with AIDS and
serious criminal backgrounds, despite their present condition, should
be subjected to similar restrictive confinement because of the risks
associated with their being placed in a lesser degree of confinement.
Another important case in this area is Smith v. Coughlin.'
Smith concerned the allegations of an inmate who had killed a
prison guard while serving two twenty-five year to life sentences for
second degree murder." After Smith was sentenced to death under
a New York law, which was subsequently declared unconstitutional,
he was confined to the Unit of Condemned Persons (UCP) at the
89. Paoli, 812 F.2d at 1492-93. The court denied Paoli's liberty interest claim by finding
that neither Maryland statutes nor the regulations created such a right. Id. at 1493. This
note does not directly deal with that question, but addresses only transfers within a prison
system. Paoli, who had been convicted of ten counts of rape and eight counts of assault to
commit rape, also attacked his confinement on eighth amendment grounds. Id. at 1491, 1493;
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Paoli claimed that the "refusal to transfer him to minimum
security" amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. Paoli, 812 F.2d at 1493. Paoli also
claimed he had been denied the right to treatment with depo-provera, a drug claimed to
lower testosterone levels and thereby decrease sexual urges. Id. at 1493. The court found
that he had been treated with the drug at all relevant times. Id.
90. Paoli, 812 F.2d at 1493. The court's primary basis for this statement is that because
no other Maryland prisoner was serving a sentence even approaching Paoli's eighteen
consecutive life sentences, singular treatment was warranted. Id.
91. Id. at 1493. The court's reference to the circumstances surrounding Paoli's
incarceration, as being so unique as to justify the singular treatment accorded him, does not
coincide with the realities of his incarceration. Assuming Paoli ever comes up for parole, his
release would probably have to be conditioned on his maintaining a certain degree of
controlled behavior. Therefore, if Paoli was ever released, the dangers the court predicted
would not be present.
92. Smith v. Coughlin, 748 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1984).
93. Id. at 785.
NOTES
Green Haven facility.' Smith challenged his confinement on due
process and equal protection grounds.' The state advanced three
reasons for this restrictive confinement. First, the state maintained
that a person sentenced to death posed special dangers to other
inmates because of the absence of the fear of disciplinary action on
those on deathrow.' Secondly, the state asserted that deathrow
inmates were, themselves, more likely to be attacked by other
inmates who want to establish a reputation among the population.97
Finally, the state said that condemned prisoners "pose a greater
suicide risk."" Again, this analysis could be easily applied to a
situation involving an inmate with AIDS, even absent the deathrow
sentence, because the state could say the inmate is a greater suicide
risk due to the disease or that he or she is dangerous to the other
inmates who may try to harm him or her in retaliation for having
AIDS.
The court found Smith's claim, that he had a liberty interest in
remaining in the general prison population, unconvincing." In
denying Smith's allegation that his confinement violated equal
protection of law because it was significantly more restrictive than
the confinement of other inmates convicted of murder, the court
relied on a rational basis test,"° a test which was explained more
94. Id. at 786. Smith was convicted of killing a prison guard, Donna Payant, in 1981,
and, under the law effective at that time, N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.27(1)(a)(ii) (McKinney 1975
& Supp. 1987), was sentenced to a mandatory death sentence under N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.06
(McKinney 1987). Smith, 748 F.2d at 785 n.2. Prior to the decision in Smith's appeal,
section 60.06 was declared unconstitutional by the New York Court of Appeals in People v.
Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 41, 468 N.E.2d 879, 479 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1226
(1984) and Smith's conviction was reduced to second degree murder. Smith, 748 F.2d at 786.
95. Smith, 748 F.2d at 786; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
96. Smith, 748 F.2d at 786.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 787. The court relied on Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983), and the law
under which Smith was sentenced, N.Y. CORRECr. LAw § 650 (McKinney 1968 & Supp.
1987), which does not create any liberty interest.
100. Smith, 748 F.2d at 788 (quoting Jones v. North Carolina Prisoner's Union, 433 U.S.
119 (1977)).
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fully in a later Supreme Court case." 1 The Smith court found that
the three justifications advanced by the state for confining these
prisoners were indeed rational bases upon which the special
classification and treatment of the appellant could be grounded." z
Finally, in addressing the issue of visitation rights, the court
held that in restricting the prisoner's visitors to only his priest,
lawyer, and doctor the state had not violated the first amendment
because it had advanced sufficient justifications for that action. 3
The state's justifications for this restriction come very close to those
advanced in Blackburn v. Snow," 4 a case in which the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit found that the state's action violated
a visitor's rights." s
The Smith case, therefore, represents a major obstacle to those
bringing claims based on an equal protection analysis because, except
for an invidious classification, a court will almost always find the
state's interest in "administrative security" a rational basis upon
which to segregate AIDS sufferers.
On the other side of this issue, however, there are several cases
which deserve some attention. Blackburn v. Snow"° involved the
claim of a prison inmate's visitor, but in effect it implicates the
101. Turner v. Safley, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2261 (1987). In Turner, the Supreme Court
indicated that the reasonableness standard adopted in Jones, 433 U.S at 119, as well as in
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), does not only apply to "presumptively dangerous" inmate
activities. Turner, 107 S. Ct. at 2261.
102. Smith, 748 F.2d at 788. The court found that since Smith had committed a serious
crime in prison and was sentenced to death, he had proven his violent nature and "was
unlikely to be deterred from violent behavior." Id. Moreover, according to the testimony of
the Superintendent of the Green Haven Correctional Facility and the Deputy Commissioner
for Facility Operations, Smith was a likely target of those prisoners seeking a reputation. Id.
Finally, Smith admitted he was depressed. Id.
103. Id. The court relied heavily on Pell v. Procunier, in denying Smith's first amendment
claim, saying that he had ample opportunity, through the permissable visits he was allowed,
to communicate with the outside world. Id., Pell, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). The prison officials
also claimed three justifications for the restrictions on visitors: disruption in prison
administration by an increase in outsider traffic; creation of security risks; and finally, an
increase in the possibility of an outsider introducing contraband into the prison. Smith, 748
F.2d at 788.
104. Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556 (1st Cir. 1985).
105. Id. at 559.
106. Id. at 556.
[Vol.VI
NOTES
rights of prisoners as well. 7 The court, in disallowing the policy of
mandatory strip searches of visitors by the prison guards, rejected
the state's supposed "institutional security justification."'" Further,
the case held that any attempt to "impute or casually transfer to
free citizens visiting a prison the same circumscription of rights
suffered by inmates" was invalid." On its face, this statement seems
quite obvious, but the distinction made here is not so clear, as
evidenced by the appeal in the Doe v. Coughlin... case.
Although not directly related to segregation of inmates with
AIDS, racial segregation in prisons was struck down in 1967 by the
United States Supreme Court in Lee v. Washington."' This case is
significant not so much for its holding, a short per curiam opinion,
but rather for the short concurrence by Justices Black, Harlan, and
Stewart."' The concurring Justices maintained that no prison
authority could, based on a mistaken interpretation of the Court's
holding, consider racial tensions in allowing segregation aimed at
maintaining security, discipline, and good order in the jails."' If such
a ban were applied to the control of AIDS related tensions, this
concurrence would provide the basis for invalidating all admini-
strative segregation decisions concerning inmates with AIDS.
However, as noted earlier in the Cordero case, persons with AIDS
have not yet been classified as a suspect class for equal protection
purposes."4
Green v. McKaskle,"' a case brought by a prisoner in a civil
rights suit, concerned allegations of restrictions on his movements
107. Id. at 567.
108. Id. at 566-67.
109. Id.
110. Doe, 125 A.D.2d 783, 509 N.Y.S.2d 209 (3d Dep't 1986). Doe addressed the denial
of a request for a conjugal visit by a prisoner with AIDS. Id. See supra notes 42-58 and
accompanying text.
111. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam).
112. Id. at 334 (Black, Harlan, Stewart, JJ., concurring).
113. Id.
114. Cordero v. Coughlin, 607 F. Supp. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). See supra notes 22-41 and
accompanying text.
115. Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1986).
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and access that were not placed on the other inmates.116 The court
ruled that Green, who appeared pro se, sufficiently stated a claim
for relief in alleging that his due process rights were violated
because he was not given an opportunity to object to his classifica-
tion."17 The court relied on Hewitt v. Helms,"8 in which prison
officials were obliged to afford minimum requirements of due
process when the state's regulations created a liberty interest.19
Additionally, the court determined that Green stated a claim
based on equal protection because he alleged that he was denied
the "same privileges, exercise periods and educational rehabilitative
programs open to other [inmates]."" Although the court charac-
terized Green's chances of winning on the equal protection claim as
"highly unlikely,""' it is quite possible to allege that the segregation
of inmates with AIDS often results in the denial of access and
participation in programs open to the rest of the prison population.
Another case which offers an analysis which may be used in
the future to attack regulations calling for the segregation of inmates
with AIDS is Lareau v. Manson." Lareau held that in overcrowded
prisons, a failure to screen newly arrived inmates for communicable
disease was a violation of due process rights."u Although this holding
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1125.
118. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
119. Green, 788 F.2d at 1125. In relying on Hewitt, the court exposes an opportunity
for attacking the segregation of prisoners with AIDS. Id. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 471-72.
Inmates with AIDS could insist, under New York law, that each inmate must be provided with
adequate sanitary conditions required for the health of the inmate. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW
§ 137(6)(b) (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1988). Therefore, inmates with AIDS could easily
attack those segregated prison areas that have deplorable conditions as violative of a liberty
interest protected by the statute. The statute provides:
The superintendent of a correctional facility may keep any inmate confined in a cell
or room, apart from the accommodations provided for inmates who are participating
in programs of the facility, ... but in any such case the following conditions shall
be observed: (b) Adequate sanitary and other conditions required for the health
of the inmate shall be maintained.
Id.
120. Green, 788 F.2d at 1125.
121. Id.
122. Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981).
123. Id. at 109.
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may appear unfavorable for inmates with AIDS, it does provide a
basis for attacking prison officials' actions concerning medical
treatment of inmates with AIDS. In most circumstances it would be
preferable to argue that AIDS is not a communicable disease at all,
but rather a reportable disease."2 4 However, Lareau's12 holding may
ultimately lead to a reasoned reaction to the AIDS crisis in prisons
because it would not allow for the unwarranted mandatory testing
of AIDS, but instead, would provide medical screening (health
checkups designed to spot communicable diseases) and treatment of
AIDS in the aftermath of a diagnosis.
The recent case of School Board of Nassau County, Florida v.
Arline"2s sheds more light on how the Supreme Court may treat a
litigant with AIDS. Arline27 involved the Federal Rehabilitation
Act of 1973,1" which prohibits discrimination against handicapped
individuals by programs that receive federal funding assistance. 29
Since federal prisons receive federal funding, it would seem that
124. The legal ramifications attached to a communicable disease, are far more drastic
than those attached to a reportable disease. For instance, the federal government has the
power to isolate and quarantine individuals "in situations involving the entry of diseased
individuals into the United States from a foreign country, the movement of an infected
individual from one state to another state, and the protection of military personnel during
time of war." Ford & Quam, supra note 58, at 366 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 264-67 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985); 21 C.F.R. §§ 1240.3, 1240.40, 1240.45, 1240.50 (1988); 42 C.F.R. §9 71.1,
71.31, 71.32, 71.34 (1988)).
125. Lareau, 651 F.2d at 96.
126. School Bd. v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).
127. Id.
128. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. 1987) provides:
No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the United States, as defined in
section 706(8) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any
program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States
Postal Service. The head of each such agency shall promulgate such regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the amendments to this section made by the
Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Act of
1978. Copies of any proposed regulation shall be submitted to appropriate
authorizing committees of the Congress, and such regulation may take effect no
earlier than the thirtieth day after the date on which such regulation is so submitted
to such committees.
Id.
129. Id.
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federal prisoners would receive protection under this Act.
In Arline" a teacher was fired from her job after suffering her
third relapse of tuberculosis within three years."' The Supreme
Court ruled that Arline was a "handicapped individual" within the
meaning of the Rehabilitation Act.'32 Arline's contagiousness, the
Court ruled, qualified as a handicap because "the contagious effects
of a disease [cannot] be meaningfully distinguished from the
disease's physical effects."33 Further, the Court held "it would be
unfair to allow an employer to seize upon the distinction between
the effects of a disease on others and the effects of a disease on a
patient and use that distinction to justify discriminatory treatment. 34
The Court was careful to state that it was not deciding whether
AIDS could be considered a handicap or whether a person could be
considered, solely on the basis of contagiousness, a handicapped
person within the meaning of the Act. 135 However, the Court's
reasoning would seem to apply to a person with AIDS, especially in
the employment context. It is unclear whether the Court would
afford the same protection for a prisoner with AIDS, but if the
same reasoning were to be applied under a similar discrimination
act, such as section 1983," it would provide a potential avenue of
attack for AIDS sufferers in prisons.137 The Court stated that under
the regulations providing interpretive assistance to the meaning of
the Act, physical impairment is defined as including "any physiologi-
cal disorder or condition ... affecting one or more of the follow-
ing body systems ... respiratory ... hemic and lymphatic."'" AIDS
would come under this definition, since it is known to affect these
130. Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1123.
131. Id. at 1125.
132. Id. at 1130.
133. Id. at 1128.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1128 n.7.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
137. The relevant legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act indicates that Congress'
intent was to have the Act only apply to those not incarcerated. S. Rep. No. 8073, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 29615, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2092.
138. Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1127.
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Significantly for AIDS victims, the Court stated that "society's
accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as
handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual
impairment."'" This statement clearly implicates those with AIDS
because, as noted earlier, much of society has indeed acted with fear
and often hostility toward carriers of AIDS. 4 The Court stated that
in making a Rehabilitation Act inquiry, other courts should defer to
the reasonable medical judgments of public health officials. 4 ' It is
important to note however, that public health officials may use this
discretion to counsel against persons with AIDS, both incarcerated
and non-incarcerated, thus effectively preventing successful claims.
The Arline decision is important for an inmate with AIDS not
only because it reveals how the Supreme Court may view a litigant
with AIDS, but also because it reveals that in future cases involving
an inmate with AIDS, prison officials will probably not be able to
successfully argue "administrative security" as the reason for
segregation. "Administrative segregation" would seem to violate the
Court's statement concerning discrimination based on a perceived
handicap.
V. MEDICAL EVIDENCE CONCERNNG THE TRANSMISSION AND
EFFECTs OF AIDS ON INMAms
An inquiry into the constitutionality of prison regulations that
allow the segregation of inmates with AIDS from the general inmate
population is not complete without addressing the medical issues
involved.
The genesis of the AIDS disease is believed to be the HIV
virus'4' which damages "primarily the cellular branch of the immune
139. See generally L. MAss, supra note 1.
140. Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1129.
141. See Lynn & Peterson, supra note 6, at 8 and text accompanying note 6.
142. Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1131.
143. L. MAss, supra note 1, at 2.
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system in humans, invading and reproducing in T-lymphocytes.' 44
After these lymphocytes are destroyed the host or carrier becomes
"immunodeficient and vulnerable to attack by viruses, fungi, protoza,
bacteria and other apparently opportunistic diseases, such as ...
(cancers).""14 It is believed to be a lifelong infection."4 Some of the
opportunistic diseases most frequently seen in cases of AIDS are
pneumonia (pneumocystis carinii), encephalitis, systematic infection
(toxoplasma gondii), meningitis (cryptococus neoformans), and
finally, Karposi's Sarcoma (malignant lesions of the skin, mucous
membranes and internal organs). 4 '
The transmission of AIDS occurs when direct bloodstream
contact is made with an infected partner's blood or semen."
Although saliva and tears can contain trace amounts of the virus, no
reported cases of AIDS have resulted from such contact.'49 It is
possible, however, that the ingestion of or other direct mucous
membrane (oral or anal) contact or bloodstream contact (as from an
open cut or wound) with the excreta of infected persons, which may
contain trace or larger amounts of blood, may pose a more
substantial risk of transmission than such contact with the tears or
saliva of infected persons.' Sweat of infected persons is not
considered to be a factor in transmission. 5'
The practices known or believed to pose the highest risk for
transmission and infection are: the use of contaminated blood or
blood products for transfusion or injection; the use of contaminated
needles, syringes, bulbs, works, or cooks; for the receptive partner,
whether female or male, unprotected anal intercourse with an
infected partner; unprotected vaginal intercourse; the ingestion of an
infected person's seminal fluid.' As to the risk of casual contact:
144. Id. at 3.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 3-4.
148. Id. at 9.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 10.
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No cases of AIDS are known to have originated through
casual contact - being or dwelling in the same physical
environment as an infected person, touching or hugging that
person, wearing that person's clothing, using that person's
furniture or otherwise exposing skin surfaces to those of that
person or to objects he or she has touched, breathing in the
vicinity of an infected person who has coughed or sneezed
or eating food that that person has prepared or touched.'53
The AIDS virus is communicable and transmissible but it is not
contagious.'54
One factor militating against the segregation of inmates with
AIDS is the side effects of the drugs which are used to treat the
opportunistic diseases which accompany the HIV infection.' The
most common drug now being used to treat those who have PCP
(pneumocystis carinii) is AZT or azidothymadine, which is frequently
accompanied by serious, toxic side effects.'56 In fact, forty-three
prisoners in New York City jails are currently receiving this
treatment. 7 Vincristine, vinblastine, and etoposide, drugs used to
treat those who have Karposi's Sarcoma, are associated with such
serious side effects as walking difficulties, neuropathy, and the
decrease in white blood cells, as well as numerous other nagging
conditions.'58 It can be concluded from this data that inmates being
treated with these drugs do not cause a serious disciplinary problem
and are not a physical threat to others. When considered in
conjunction with the reasons for segregation of inmates with AIDS,
medical evidence seems to indicate the irrationality of segregation
153. Id. at 10-11.
154. Id. at 12.
155. Id. at 23.
156. Id. at 22-23.
157. Richard Koehler, Testimony at the Public Hearings on AIDS and the Criminal
Justice System, Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Oct. 16, 1987) (author's
notes on file at the New York Law School Journal of Human Rights office) [hereinafter
Koehler Testimony].
158. GAY MEN'S HEALTH CRISIS, DRUGS USED IN THE TREATMENT OF OPPORTUNISTIC
INFECT[ONS AND CANCERS ASSOCIATED WrrH AIDS 3 (1987).
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decisions by prison officials. At most, inmates being treated with
drugs for opportunistic infections pose only the mildest physical
threat to others due to the debilitating effects caused by these
drugs. Viewed as such, claims of "administrative security" cannot
withstand thorough analysis. Such claims have as their sole basis the
fear, tensions, and ignorance of the prison officials and unaffected
inmates. Of course, those with AIDS who are not suffering from
any opportunistic infections do not present any risk to those around
them as long as minimal precautions are taken. The only rational
basis upon which prison officials can segregate appears to be the
risk of the spread of the disease, but that threat would be sig-
nificantly decreased if there was a serious attempt to educate those
newly incarcerated." 9
Pursuant to the Public Health Law," and under the Sanitary
Code, 6' New York State has classified AIDS as a reportable disease.
Therefore, all cases or suspected cases are required to be reported
to the Commissioner of Health by all health administrators and
those in charge of state institutions.62 Additionally, those establish-
ments which make facilities available for high risk sexual activity (i.e.
anal intercourse and fellatio) shall be considered nuisances and
closed by order of the state and local health commissioners and local
boards of health."6 Since it is well known that there is a high
159. See infra notes 190, 205, 216-18, 223-33 and accompanying text.
160. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw §§ 225(4), 225(5)(a), 206(1)(j) (McKinney 1971 & Supp.
1987). Sections 225(4) and (5)(a) provide:
4. The public health council shall have power by the affirmative vote of a
majority of its members to establish, and from time to time, amend and repeal
sanitary regulations, to be known as the sanitary code of the state of New York,
subject to approval by the commissioner.
5. The sanitary code may:
(a) deal with any matters affecting the security of life or health or the preserva-
tion and improvement of public health in the state of New York, and with any
matters as to which the jurisdiction is conferred upon the public health council.
Id. §§ 225(4), 225(5)(a). Section 206(1)0) provides for the Commissioner to have the power
to order scientific studies to be conducted to reduce the rate of mortality and improve the
quality of medical care. Id. § 206 (1)(j).
161. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 24-1.1 (1985).
162. Id.
163. Id. §§ 24-2.2, 24-2.3.
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incidence of anal intercourse among prisoners (both consensual and
nonconsensual), prisons could be forced to close under the terms of
the Code.1" Therefore, prison officials could, themselves, expose the
prison to possible forced closure when they state, as the reason for
segregation of inmates with AIDS, the risk of forced sex.
In addition to the regulations classifying AIDS as a reportable
disease, the Family Reunion Program,'" established under the Cor-
rections Law of New York State,1" provides for a special review
procedure to determine the eligibility of an inmate who has been
diagnosed as having a communicable disease.67 The statute does not
specifically define what constitutes a communicable disease, rather
the facility's health services staff is directed to notify the program
coordinator of any diagnosis of a communicable disease." As to the
special review, it appears that a counselor determines through a
review of the prisoner's health record whether there is evidence of
a recent communicable disease." The counselor, when making this
determination, consults the health services staff to ascertain whether
there is "present serious risk of contagion about which prospective
visitors should be advised."'7 The regulations further provide that,
upon a determination of disapproval, the program coordinator must
prepare a memorandum explaining the reason for disapproval and
subsequently meet with the inmate, giving him or her a copy of the
164. See, Vaid, Prisons, in AIDS AND THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC 235 (H. L.
Dalton ed. 1987) [hereinafter Vaid Text].
165. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 220.1 (1985).
166. N.Y. CORRECr. LAW §§ 112, 146 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1987). Corrections Law
§ 112 gives the Commissioner of Correction the power and control over the department and
inmates confined therein. Id. § 112. Additionally, the Commissioner is given the authority
to inquire into any improper conduct and to issue subpeonas and compel attendance of
witnesses. Id. § 146. Corrections Law § 146 lists the persons who are authorized to visit
all correctional facilities. Primarily, these are persons in high government positions and the
judiciary. Id. More importantly, § 146 provides that "[n]o other person not otherwise
authorized by law shall be permitted to enter a correctional facility except by authority of the
commissioner of correction under such regulations as the Commissioner shall prescribe." Id.
167. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 7, § 220.3(c)(8) (1985).
168. Id.
169. Id. § 220.4(a)(2)(iii).
170. Id.
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disapproval. 71 The inmate is given the right to appeal this disap-
proval to the Assistant Commissioner, who must respond to the
inmate's appeal within two weeks and whose decision is final."
One point to note in this process is the requirement that advisement
be given to prospective visitors; there is no mention that the
necessity of such advisement automatically disqualifies the inmate. 73
The last of the New York prison regulations affecting prisoners
with AIDS are those dealing with admission to special housing
units. 4  The regulations provide for automatic admission when
inmates are physically unable to participate in the programs of the
facility or for those assigned there temporarily by the central office
reclassification and review team for purposes of evaluation and
reclassification.'75 The regulations explicitly state that special housing
units may not be used for punishing inmates through confinement. 76
The urgency that the topic of AIDS inside prisons presents to
state officials charged with the responsibility of dealing with this
problem has been addressed recently by the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York at its public hearings on AIDS and the
Criminal Justice System.'" The hearings, held over a two day period,
were preceded by a June, 1987 release of a preliminary report by
the Joint Sub-Committee on AIDS in the Criminal Justice System. 8
Among the recommendations of the report were: the preparation
of a "comprehensive educational program about AIDS for those in
all components of the criminal justice system,""9 a system for
171. Id. §§ 220.4(d)(1)(i) - (iii).
172. Id. § 220.4(d)(1)(iii).
173. Id. § 220.4(a)(2)(iii).
174. Id. § 304.
175. Id. §§ 304.1(a)(3) - (4).
176. Id. § 300.3(c).
177. Public Hearings, AIDS and the Criminal Justice System, at the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York (Oct. 15-16, 1987).
178. AsSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, AIDs AND THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM: A PRELIMINARY REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1987) [hereinafter
PRELIMINARY REPORT].
179. Id. at 22. See also Justice System Faulted in Handling Persons with Aids, N.Y.L.J.,
July 27, 1987, at 2, col. 2.
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tracking the cases which involve AIDS defendants,1" and a commit-
tee to coordinate the release of defendants who develop AIDS while
in prison.18' Several city and state officials testified before the joint
subcommittee, which was chaired by Faith Colangelo, Esq. and the
Honorable Richard Andrias, Supervising Judge for the New York
County Criminal Court."
One of the speakers before the subcommittee was the Commis-
sioner of the New York Department of Correction, Richard
Koehler.1" Koehler testified that twenty-five percent of the inmates
in New York City jails have tested positive for the HIV virus and
that AIDS is the leading cause of death in New York City jails."l
There are currently forty-three inmates receiving treatment for
AIDS with AZT.1" Koehler emphasized the need for a tracking
system for those inmates with AIDS because, without a system, the
delay in processing would result in longer incarceration for these
inmates." Koehler also called for an increase in the level of skilled
nursing care at the Rikers Island Facility.'87
Among the proposals Commissioner Koehler recommended to
the sub-committee were the following: continuation of the educa-
tion and training programs for staff, assisted by the Department of
Health; continuation and support for an orientation session for new
inmates which would include a video on AIDS and a question and
answer session assisted by the Department of Health staff; distribu-
tion of condoms upon release; implementation of an AZT treatment
180. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 178, at 28.
181. Id.
182. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, News Release (Oct. 8, 1987)
(discussing the Hearings on Aids and the Criminal Justice System to be held at the Association
of the Bar, Oct. 15-16, 1987).
183. Koehler Testimony, supra note 157, at 1.
184. Id. Recently a New York State trial judge ordered the New York City Department
of Corrections to resume treating a prisoner who had AIDS with AZT within 48 hours. Wise,
City Prison Officials Ordered to Give AIDS Drug to Inmate, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 22, 1987, at 1, col.
3.
185. AZT is the only drug approved for the treatment of AIDS related infections by the
Federal Food and Drug Administration. Wise, supra note 184, at 1, col. 3.
186. Koehler Testimony, supra note 157, at 1.
187. Id. Koehler stated that 412 correction officers and staff received such training. Id.
1988]
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program, in conjunction with Montefiore Hospital, for intravenous
drug users who have AIDS; and finally, a primary need for addition-
al beds.ss These proposals seem to indicate a policy against
segregation and an attempt to deal with inmates with AIDS in a
nondiscriminatory way. The Commissioner's proposals for tracking
and educational programs present a more reasoned response to the
problem at hand, and are a welcome departure from outright
segregation as a response to the risk of forced sex.
Another speaker who testified on the issue was Urvashi Vaid,
Esq., Public Information Director of the National Gay & Lesbian
Task Force."8 Among the issues addressed by Vaid were HIV
testing, segregation, education, and alternatives to incarceration."
In testifying on the issue of segregation, Vaid stressed that calls
for segregation of all prisoners with AIDS, ARC, and HIV were
closely linked to mandatory testing for HIV.' The initial response
by prison officials was to segregate those suspected of having AIDS
and test for HIV in order to prevent the spread of the disease. But,
given the reality of overcrowded prisons, this approach fails."g It
would be "impossible to segregate all prisoners with AIDS related
conditions in the New York state prison system."19a Vaid emphasized
that the best defense against AIDS transmission is education."
Vaid, in discussing segregation, reiterated arguments made in
Lee v. Washington,195 Blackburn v. Snow,1" and Green v. McKaskle.197
She illustrated the various deprivations which segregated prisoners
with AIDS suffer due to the fears, tensions, and ignorance of other
188. Id.
189. Urvashi Vaid, Testimony at the Public Hearings on AIDS and the Criminal Justice
System, Association of the Bar of the City of New York, (Oct. 16, 1987) [hereinafter Vaid
Testimony].
190. Id. at V 3.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1 12.
193. Id.
194. Id. at V 18.
195. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
196. Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556 (1st Cir. 1985).
197. Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1986).
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inmates and those in authority."' However, Blackburn,'99 Lee,'
Green,2"' and also Lareau,' are concerned less with the threat posed
by AIDS sufferers towards others than with the threat of others
towards those with AIDS. z' As Vaid pointed out, however, this
distinction does not make such administrative decisions any less
violative of the rights of these inmates and those who wish to visit
them.' Further, she demonstrated that, should increased education-
al efforts be made, the financial savings involved would be significant
and the incidence of transmission would decrease comparatively.2 5
In writing on segregation of inmates with AIDS, Vaid pointed
to numerous prison officials' decisions which have resulted in
inmates being placed in medical observation cells which are not
suitable for long term confinement, and being denied access to
certain essential services, which handicaps their ability to earn good
time credits that could reduce their period of incarceration.' °
Segregation of inmates with AIDS may also lead to psychological
harm.2"7 Vaid recognized that medical segregation may be justified
in instances where the inmate's condition "warrants such isolation:
if, for example, the inmate cannot control bodily secretions or is so
198. See Vaid Testimony, supra note 189, at V 11.
199. Blackburn, 771 F.2d at 556.
200. Lee, 390 U.S. at 333.
201. Green, 788 F.2d at 1116.
202. Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981).
203. Cf Lee, 390 U.S. at 334 (Black, J., concurring).
204. See, Vaid Testimony, supra note 189, at 1 13.
205. See, Vaid Text, supra note 164, at 244.
206. Id at 241. In this regard, note the decision of one New York court in Bradley v.
Ward, 81 Misc. 2d 713, 366 N.Y.S.2d 841 (Sup. Ct. 1975), which held that, under New York
law, inmates do not have the right to demand or require the allowance of good time credits.
Id. at 716, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 844. The court further stated that the Department of Corrections
has the sole discretion to either grant, deny, or withhold good time credit allowances when
that discretion is exercised in accordance with the law. Id.
207. Vaid Text, supra note 164, at 241. Some examples of discriminatory treatment which
may lead to psychological harm are directly related to the practices of some correctional
personnel. Id. Many inmates report that guards push food trays under cell doors and ignore
inmates' calls for medical assistance. Id. In addition, the loss of confidentiality resulting from
being branded as an inmate with AIDS ensures that the inmate will never return to the
general prison population without risking serious harm. Id.
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weak that he needs intensive care."' Vaid criticized the court in
the Cordero2'° case for failing to distinguish between segregation for
health care from segregation intended to stop the spread of AIDS.21
Vaid observed that courts tend to reflect what prison officials
maintain is their administrative discretion in preserving order."'
In addition to testifying, Vaid submitted a copy of the chapter
she had written in the recently published book, AIDS And The
Law.212 In this chapter, Vaid discussed a study done by the ACLU
National Prison Project (NPP) and the National Institute of Justice
(NIJ), in conjunction with the American Correctional Association
(ACA), in which data was collected from all of the federal and state
correctional systems to determine the prevalence of AIDS, ARC,
and HIV seropositivity among prisoners.213 The findings of the
NIJ/ACA study concluded that New York, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania had seventy percent of the 1,232 AIDS cases reported
by responding correctional systems.214 The distribution of the cases
showed that a majority of these inmates had been intravenous drug
users. 2 s This last statistic confirms the urgency which is needed for
educational and other programs toward these aspects of AIDS and
drug abuse.
In both her article and her testimony, Vaid emphasized that
education oriented toward changing the behavior of those at risk of
AIDS must be stressed, since transmission is impossible without the
behavioral cooperation of two people.2 6 Vaid pointed out that it
cost the state $40,000 to $300,000 per inmate with AIDS for 1986.217
The cost of alternatives to incarceration, such as work release,
208. Id at 242.
209. Cordero v. Coughlin, 607 F. Supp. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
210. Vaid Text, supra note 164, at 242.
211. Id.
212. Id at 235-50.
213. Id. at 237.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 243.
217. Vaid Testimony, supra note 189, at 20.
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represent a much lower investment alternative.218
Another finding of the NIJ/ACA report revealed that the virus
is being transmitted inside prisons.219 Since the most common
method for transmission inside prisons would have to be sex,220
programs aimed at slowing the spread of the virus through sexual
contact would then be of utmost importance. 2 Vaid indicated
however, that because the epidemiology of the disease gives them
little reason to worry, rapists inside prisons are not easily dis-
couraged; they need more compelling reasons to stop their ac-
tivity.'m Vaid stressed that education can slow the spread of
AIDS.2' Since inmates fear the disease as much as anybody else,
they will pay careful attention to educational efforts. 24 Rapists may
also curtail their aggression if shown that active partners in anal
intercourse, though at a lesser risk of contracting the virus, still risk
contracting this fatal disease.'z Additionally, she recommended that
prison officials use the methods they have always used for identifying
and controlling violent inmates: "objective classification ... ; the
hiring of more guards to provide better supervision; harsher
penalties for sexual assault; and the elimination of unsupervised
dormitory housing."'2
The NIJ/ACA report also recommended that education should
be the correctional facilities' foundation in their efforts to prevent
the transmission of the virus.27 Along with a videotape shown in
New York State prisons, entitled "AIDS: A Bad Way to Die," every
federal correctional facility shows a videotape explaining the medical
facts about AIDS and warns against sharing tattooing needles and
218. Id.
219. Vaid Text, supra note 164, at 237-38.
220. Id. at 238.
221. Id
222. Id.
223. Id
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 243.
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razors. M
Vaid insisted that "educational efforts need to be ongoing,
authoritative, and consistent."'  She claimed the biggest factor
restricting educational efforts is the reluctance of prison officials to
address safe-sex practices for inmates; these safe-sex practices call
explicitly for distribution of condoms.'
Finally, Vaid recognized the fear of an increase in sexual
activity resulting from increased education and distribution of
condoms as shortsighted and ignorant of the realities of prison life. 1
Vaid stated that the NIJ/ACA report recommends using live training
sessions, in addition to videotapes and printed materials, to help
improve prison educational programs." She emphasized that
"education allows officials to avoid draconian schemes for controlling
transmission . .. [, such as] antibody-status identity cards, mandatory
testing, and quarantine.""
VI. Doe v. Cougidin RivisrmD
Earlier this note discussed the Doe v. Couglin' case in which
a prisoner with AIDS alleged that the denial of his request to
participate in the Family Reunion Program at the Auburn Facility
was violative of equal protection and irrational.' Doe lost both at
trial and at the appellate level, but recently argued an appeal before
New York's highest court, the court of appeals.'
The New York Court of Appeals decided Doe v. Coughlin on
November 24, 1987."3 By a four to three vote, the court of appeals
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 243-44.
231. Id. at 244.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Doe v. Coughlin, 125 A.D.2d 78, 509 N.Y.S.2d 209 (3d Dep't 1986). See supra
notes 42-58 and accompanying text.
235. Doe, 125 A.D.2d 78, 509 N.Y.S.2d 209.
236. Doe v. Coughlin, 71 N.Y.2d 48, 518 N.E.2d 536, 523 N.Y.S.2d 782 (1987).
237. Id.
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upheld the decision of the lower courts denying the Does' claims for
relief. 5 Specifically the court addressed claims involving the marital
right to privacy due process, and equal protection as well as the
Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973,"3 but found no relief available
for the Does.' ® Although the marital right to privacy is not within
the scope of this Note, the other claims put forth by the Does shall
be briefly discussed.
As to the due process liberty interest claim, the court focused
on whether or not the inmate had a "legitimate expectation of the
benefit which creates the protected constitutional interest . 24.... A1
The court held that since the admission criteria for the Family
Reunion Program are made up of fifteen subjective factors, one of
them being diagnosis of a communicable disease, 42 no right to the
program's entitlements was created. 43 The balancing test involving
these fifteen factors is "heavily discretionary and holds out no more
than the possibility" of entitlement. Finally, the fact that the
238. Id. It was reported that the decision produced "a highly unusual division of the
court, which [had] been unanimous in more than 90% of the cases decided by it in the last
two years." McMahon, Ban Upheld on Conjugal Visits to State Prisoners with AIDS, N.Y.L.J.,
Nov. 25, 1987, at 1, col. 3.
239. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
240. Doe, 71 N.Y.2d at 52-61, 518 N.E.2d at 538-44, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 785-90. The court
quickly dismissed the Does' claim based on the Federal Rehabilitation Act by finding that
since Doe was infected with a communicable disease, he was not "otherwise qualified" under
the requirements of the Act. Id. at 61, 518 N.E.2d at 544, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
241. Id. at 55, 518 N.E.2d at 540, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
242. Id. at 55 n.1., 518 N.E.2d at 541 n.1, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 787 n.1. The fifteen factors
listed were:
(1) length of time in incarceration; (2) degree of institutional adjustment; (3)
eligibility for temporary release; (4) security classification; (5) assignment to a special
housing unit; (6) pattern of disruptive behavior; (7) prior violations of Family
Reunion Program regulations; (8) designation as a central monitoring case; (9)
outstanding warrants; (10) nature of conviction; (11) parole violation status; (12)
protective custody status; (13) participation in some other special program; (14)
assignment to mental hygiene unit; (15) diagnosis as having a communicable disease.
Id. (emphasis added) (citing N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 7, §§ 220.3 (1), (2) (1986)).
However,. Doe would still have been a good candidate for participation since eligibility was
determined based on a balancing test. Id. at 55-56, 518 N.E.2d at 541, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
Apparently, though, his infection was the overriding factor.
243. Id. at 56, 518 N.E.2d at 541, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
244. Id. (citations omitted).
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inmate had been approved once before does not create a legitimate
expectation because the regulations provide for a discretionary
review each time the inmate requests a visit.245 The court dismissed
the Does' argument that AIDS is only a reportable disease and not
a communicable disease, stating that since AIDS can be transmitted
from person to person through blood, semen, or breast milk it is
routinely viewed as a communicable disease.'z
As to equal protection, the court acknowledged that administra-
tive and legislative classifications are subject to equal protection
review, but equal protection "requires only that a classification which
results in unequal treatment rationally further 'some legitimate,
articulated state purpose."'247 The court then pointed out that since
the classification was not based on a matter of constitutional right
or a suspect classification, a higher level of scrutiny was not
necessary.2" All the commissioner needed to show was "a rational
relationship to a legitimate State purpose."49 In this regard, the
court referred to the medical knowledge on AIDS and the
seriousness of the disease, again requiring the Does to guarantee
that the disease would not be spread to a nonprisoner if the
conjugal visit was allowed." ° Unpersuaded by such a guarantee, the
court reaffirmed the Appellate Division's belief that a possibility of
transmission still remained."1 The dissenters took issue with this
assertion by maintaining that the majority's position relied on a
series of "unwarranted presumptions," among them that Doe's wife
would commit adultery, that any connection was "so remote as to
render the determination to deny [the Does] entirely the benefits of
the Family Reunion Program irrational and unjustifiable.""2  The
245. Id.
246. Id. at 57, 518 N.E.2d at 542, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
247. Id. at 56, 518 N.E.2d at 541-42, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 788 (citing McGinnis v. Royster,
410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974); Foss v. City of
Rochester, 65 N.Y.2d 247, 256-57, 480 N.E.2d 717, 722, 491 N.Y.S.2d 128, 133 (1985)).
248. Id. at 57, 518 N.E.2d at 542, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 57-58, 518 N.E.2d at 542, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
252. Id. at 71, 518 N.E.2d at 551-52, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 797 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
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majority responded to the dissent on this point by raising the
possibility of the transmission of the disease from Jane Doe's body
if she were to become pregnant or single in the future."
The court responded to the Does' claim that the rights of
nonprisoners were being restricted by stating that the marital rights
of all inmates are limited by the goals of confinement.2 4 The court
said it would be absurd to say that because a conjugal program was
established at a prison facility it revived the rights forfeited by
confinement."' Finally, the court deferred to administrative
discretion and found that the classification bore a rational relation-
ship to the proper and successful operation of the program."
The claim under the Rehabilitation Act failed, according to the
court, because the Does had not proven that John Doe was
"otherwise qualified" to participate in the conjugal visit program.""
The court reasoned that since Doe was infected with AIDS, a
communicable disease, he was not "otherwise qualified" for participa-
tion in the program because applicants must be free of communi-
cable disease."
The two concurring judges in Doe both expressed disagreement
as to the level of scrutiny applied by the majority.5 9 Most important-
ly, Chief Judge Wachtler thought that a higher standard of scrutiny
was required because a constitutionally protected right was involved,
that is, the right to marital intimacy.' Further, the Chief Judge
noted that he understood that the Does never argued that alterna-
tives for exercising the right remained open, that there were
alternative avenues, nor that they could be accommodated without
253. Id. at 58 n.3, 518 N.E.2d at 542 n.3, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 788 n.3.
254. Id. at 58-59, 518 N.E.2d at 542-43, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 789. The court stated that the
limitation on marital intimacy is justified by "legitimate penological reasons, punishment,
security and deterrence." Id. at 58, 518 N.E.2d at 543, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
255. Id. at 58-59, 518 N.E.2d at 543, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
256. Id. at 59-60, 518 N.E.2d at 543, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 789-90.
257. Id. at 61, 518 N.E.2d at 544, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 61-63, 518 N.E.2d at 544-45, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 790-92 (Bellacosa, J. & Wachtler,
C.J., concurring).
260. Id. at 61-62, 518 N.E.2d at 545, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 791 (Wachtler, C. concurring).
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exposing the visitor to the infection."1 This seems to ignore the safe
sexual practices argument as well as educational proposals made by
the Does and others.' Finally, the Chief Judge stated "consider-
ation of alternatives to complete inaccess to the Family Reunion
Program [would] be important in future cases."'
In a lengthy dissent, three judges of the court argued that the
majority misread the purpose of the program.' The dissent argued
that although admission to the program is not a right, the decision
to engage in or abstain from sexual relations, once admitted,
implicates a fundamental right.2' In turning down the Does, the
dissent argued, the Commissioner denied the Does the benefit of
the program "solely because of the manner in which they [chose] to
exercise their marital right."'2 Further, the dissenters argued that
the Commissioner's interest, reduction in possible transmission of the
disease, did not satisfy Tumer's27 valid penological purpose test.'
In addition, the dissent contended that an inmate with a com-
municable disease should be given the special review and advisement
procedure that is mandated if evidence shows recent incidence of a
communicable disease.2' Finally, the dissent viewed the Commis-
sioner's action as an "exaggerated response" which unreasonably
curtailed the rights of nonprisoners.27 °
261. Id. at 62, 518 N.E.2d at 545, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 791.
262. Brief for Appellant at 40, Doe v. Coughlin, 71 N.Y.2d 48, 518 N.E.2d 536, 523
N.Y.S.2d 784 (1987) (No. 219).
263. Doe, 71 N.Y.2d at 62-63, 518 N.E.2d at 545, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 791 (Wachtler, CJ.,
concurring).
264. Id. at 63, 518 N.E.2d at 546, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 792 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
265. Id. at 67, 518 N.E.2d at 548.49, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
266. Id., 518 N.E.2d at 549, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
267. Turner v. Safley, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2261 (1987).
268. Doe, 71 N.Y.2d at 68-74, 518 N.E.2d at 549-53, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 795-800 (Alexander,
J., dissenting).
269. Id. at 72, 518 N.E.2d at 552, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 798.
270. Id. at 71-72, 518 N.E.2d at 552, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 798.
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VIL CONCLUSION
Administrative discretion presents a great obstacle to claims
based on constitutional violations by prisoners with AIDS. However,
from an examination of the relevant case law and medical evidence,
it is clear that inmates with AIDS can receive greater protection
against violations of due process and equal protection if stronger
efforts are made to educate both those who run the prison system
and those who are in it. It seems clear that testing and/or screen-
ing, combined with segregating, does not specifically target the
prisoners who engage in consensual or forced sexual acts. When
this is added to the problem of segregation and the vast overcrowd-
ing that is a reality of prisons in most states, the impossibility of
segregating all those with AIDS in the future becomes clear. Basic
constitutional principles seem to indicate the fallaciousness of forcing
AIDS victims to give up their constitutional rights to adequate
facilities due to threats posed against them by other inmates. Would
it not be a better policy to identify the more violent inmates and
deal with them appropriately?
Supporting this analysis is the medical evidence which clearly
indicates the minimal risk of transmission from casual contact.
There is no secret to solving the problem of inmates with AIDS; it
takes the reversal of unsafe behaviors. The correctional commission,
politicians, and health officials must work together to deal with this
problem before it is too late.
Robert J. Hoffman
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